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DO FACEBOOK AND TWITTER MAKE YOU A 
PUBLIC FIGURE?:  
HOW TO APPLY THE GERTZ PUBLIC FIGURE 
DOCTRINE TO SOCIAL MEDIA 
Matthew Lafferman† 
Abstract 
In Gertz v. Welch, the Supreme Court expanded First 
Amendment protections to defamation law by requiring a plaintiff 
who qualified as a public figure to prove a higher burden of proof to 
recover for damages under a defamation suit. The Court relied on two 
major rationales to delineate the Gertz doctrine: public figures 
“voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury” and had 
“significantly greater access to the channels of effective 
communication.” Applying this doctrine to online media poses 
challenges, specifically when applied to social media platforms. Many 
scholars have recognized that social media users have equal access to 
the same basic media features, rendering the Gertz Court’s access-to-
the-media rationale inapplicable when applied to social media. A 
216% rise in defamation suits against Internet users in the last three 
years alone, due to the recent discovery that most homeowner’s 
insurance policies cover libel liability, signals an almost inevitable 
rise in defamation suits that will eventually force courts to face the 
challenge of applying the Gertz public figure doctrine to social 
media. 
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This Comment offers an approach that reconciles the problems 
of applying the public figure doctrine to social media. This Comment 
argues that courts should require defendants to overcome certain 
initial presumptions by clear and convincing evidence before 
designating a social media user an involuntary public figure or a 
general public figure. Moreover, when recommending an approach 
for courts to identify voluntary activity on a social network for 
limited-purpose public figures, courts should avoid defining mere 
access to social media as voluntary activity and instead conclude 
such access is an extension of an individual’s private life. This 
approach would allow courts to apply much of the currently existing 
public figure doctrine to social media and help courts avoid the 
negative legal and policy consequences of abolishing the doctrine 
altogether. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Smith, like the majority of American adults,1 has a social 
media profile, and he posts daily on his whereabouts, hobbies, and 
other interests. Mr. Smith becomes involved in promoting animal 
rights and, over a period of several months, he posts numerous 
accounts of animal brutality and encourages philanthropic action on 
his profile, which is accessible to around eight hundred “friends.”2 
Ms. Jones, who has access to Mr. Smith’s social media site, accuses 
Mr. Smith of being a fraud and labels him an animal killer. 
Experiencing reputational damage, Mr. Smith sues Ms. Jones for 
defamation. Can Ms. Jones claim Mr. Smith is a public figure and 
therefore avoid liability unless Mr. Smith can prove she acted with 
actual malice? Mr. Smith arguably thrust himself into a public 
controversy by posting comments on a controversial subject. 
However, finding Mr. Smith a public figure could result in defining 
every social media user as a public figure, which would substantially 
reduce the potential damages that many users could recover for 
defamation under the stringent actual malice standard.3 On the other 
hand, if courts were to avoid applying the public figure test 
altogether, it could deter many users who fear defamation liability 
from using social networks,4 chilling speech on social media that has 
proved to be socially beneficial in recent political and social 
 
 1. The Infinite Dial 2011: Navigating Digital Platforms, ARBITRON INC. & EDISON 
RESEARCH, 4, http://www.edisonresearch.com/Infinite_Dial_2011_ExecSummary.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 29, 2012) (study showing that more than half of all Americans aged twelve and 
older have a profile on Facebook); Tom Webster, The Social Habit 2011, EDISON RESEARCH 
(May 29, 2011), http://www.edisonresearch.com/home/archives/2011/05/the_social_habit_2011.
php (research showing that fifty-two percent of Americans aged twelve and older have one or 
more social networking pages). 
 2. See Adding Friends & Friend Requests, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/help/friends/requests (last visited Feb. 23, 2012). 
 3. Chris Williams, Comment, The Communications Decency Act and New York Times 
v. Sullivan: Providing Public Figure Defamation a Home on the Internet, 43 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 491, 502-03 (2010) (“[The actual malice] standard proves a difficult hurdle for public 
figure plaintiffs to clear, thus making the likelihood of success in a public figure defamation 
action minimal.”) (footnote omitted). 
 4. Jeff Kosseff, Private or Public? Eliminating the Gertz Defamation Test, 2011 U. ILL. 
J.L. TECH & POL’Y 249, 272 (2011) (“If such voluntary action were enough to qualify someone 
to be a limited-purpose public figure, it could have an additional chilling effect on free speech: it 
would cause people who fear defamation to not take advantage of services such as Facebook.”). 
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movements, such as the Arab Spring.5 
This hypothetical underscores the problems that courts will 
encounter when applying the public figure doctrine announced in 
Gertz v. Welch6 to social media.7 The public figure doctrine extended 
First Amendment protections to libel law by requiring a public figure 
plaintiff to establish that the defendant defamed the plaintiff with 
actual malice, instead of negligence, in order to recover damages for 
defamation.8 With more courts applying libel law, instead of slander, 
to Internet postings9 the application of the public figure doctrine to 
social media users has become particularly relevant. Furthermore, 
courts cannot necessarily look to similar forums when applying the 
public figure doctrine to social media. The widespread use of social 
media10 and its fully customizable privacy settings11 make judicial 
application of the public figure doctrine to social media 
distinguishable from application to publicly available computer 
 
 5. See Clay Shirky, The Political Power of Social Media, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 28, 29-33 
(2011). 
 6. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 7. For the purposes of this Comment, social media is used interchangeably with social 
networks, and refers to social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and 
Google+. 
 8. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-43. 
 9. See ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 2:3 (4th ed. 2012). Historically, 
slander was “oral or aural defamation” while libel was “written or visual defamation.” Id. at 2-9. 
Courts have applied libel law to defamation resulting from Internet postings. Id. at 2-12 (citing 
W.J.A. v. D.A., 4 A.3d 601, 604 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010)); Too Much Media, LLC v. 
Hale, 993 A.2d 845, 865 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010), aff’d, 20 A.3d 364 (N.J. 2011) (“[I]t 
may take more aforethought to type an [I]nternet posting than it does to blurt out spoken 
words. . . . [U]nlike spoken words that evaporate, Internet postings have permanence, as the 
posts can remain on that particular site for an indefinite period and can easily be copied and 
forwarded.”). Judge Robert D. Sack argues that in the future the distinctions between libel and 
slander will vanish, and the two causes of action will eventually evolve into the “single tort of 
‘defamation.’” SACK, supra, at 2-12 (citing Collins v. Purdue Univ., 703 F. Supp. 2d 862 passim 
(N.D. Ind. 2010); Dugan v. Mittal Steel USA Inc., 929 N.E.2d 184 passim (Ind. 2010)). 
 10. See sources cited supra note 1. 
 11. Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and 
Scholarship, 13 J. OF COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 211 (2008) (“What makes social 
network sites unique is not that they allow individuals to meet strangers, but rather that they 
enable users to articulate and make visible their social networks. This can result in connections 
between individuals that would not otherwise be made . . . .”); see also Data Use Policy, 
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/full_data_use_policy#onfb (last visited Feb. 29, 2012) 
(discussing profile “visibility control”); Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER, 
http://twitter.com/privacy (last visited Feb. 29, 2012) (discussing privacy settings). 
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bulletin boards,12 blogs,13 or the Internet in general.14 
Particular developments have also signaled a rise in online 
defamation suits. The recent discovery that most homeowner’s 
insurance policies cover libel liability has contributed to a 216% 
increase in Internet defamation suits against bloggers and Internet 
users over the past three years alone.15 Attorneys now target these 
groups in online defamation suits because they can recover up to the 
limits of these individual’s policies.16 The increased chance that a 
plaintiff will collect in defamation suits, combined with the growing 
number of social media participants, make an overall increase in these 
suits—especially those concerning social media platforms—
inevitable.17 
However, courts face challenges when applying the public figure 
doctrine to social media, especially the particular dilemma of 
invalidating Gertz.18 The Supreme Court relied on two major 
rationales to delineate the Gertz doctrine: public figures “voluntarily 
exposed themselves to increased risk of injury” and had “significantly 
greater access to the channels of effective communication.”19 Each 
social media user has access to the same basic features as every other 
user on the same social media platform.20 As a result, it is extremely 
 
 12. See Thomas D. Brooks, Note, Catching Jellyfish in the Internet: The Public-Figure 
Doctrine and Defamation on Computer Bulletin Boards, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 
461 (1995) (discussing how the public figure doctrine should apply to online bulletin boards). 
 13. See Anthony Ciolli, Bloggers as Public Figures, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 255 (2007) 
(discussing how the public figure doctrine should apply to bloggers). 
 14. See Aaron Perzanowski, Comment, Relative Access to Corrective Speech: A New Test 
for Requiring Actual Malice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 833 (2006) (discussing how the public figure 
doctrine should apply to the Internet in general); Michael Hadley, Note, The Gertz Doctrine and 
Internet Defamation, 84 VA. L. REV. 477 (1998) (same). 
 15. James C. Goodale, Can You Say Anything You Want on the Net?, 242 N.Y. L.J. 3 
(2009). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Online Defamation Cases in England and Wales “Double,” BBC NEWS (Aug. 
26, 2011, 1:03 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14684620 (stating that the increase in social 
media users has led to an increase in online defamation cases). 
 18. This Comment assumes that social media users are initially private figures, and have 
essentially equal media contacts in the material world. As a result, this Comment does not 
discuss applying the public figure doctrine to social media users who may already qualify as 
public figures. 
 19. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974). 
 20. See Boyd & Ellison, supra note 11, at 211-14. 
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difficult, if not impossible, for one social media user to have “greater 
access to the channels of effective communication” than other users.21 
Thus, the Gertz Court’s rationale for what constitutes a public figure 
is partially inapplicable to social media users.22 Despite this 
inapplicability, Gertz can still be relevant in social media defamation 
cases. Courts could retain Gertz’s relevance by upholding Gertz’s 
other main principle—namely, that a social media user voluntarily 
assumes the risk of injury—when finding a social media user is a 
public figure.23 
It is not to say that this approach is without problems. Focusing 
on the voluntary principle of Gertz is especially challenging when 
applying the involuntary public figure designation, which has no 
assumption of risk or voluntary action test.24 Moreover, courts also 
must be cautious when determining what action is “voluntary,” which 
 
 21. See Ann E. O’Connor, Note, Access to Media All A-Twitter: Revisiting Gertz and the 
Access to Media Test in the Age of Social Networking, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 507, 526, 529 (2011) 
(“Communicating constantly through social networking and other Internet service providers has 
become so much a regular and routine practice of private individuals that there is not an 
assumption of receiving widespread attention from those communications. . . . When the Gertz 
Court spoke about accessing the media and the ease by which public figures were able to do so, 
it was addressing in simple terms what was a simple truth: those with a firm grasp on the 
public’s attention through their position as public officials or widely known figures would have 
the opportunity to garner the press’s attention to rebut statements made against them.”); 
Nathaniel Gleicher, Note, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard, 118 
YALE L.J. 320, 335 (2008) (“[B]ecause anyone can easily publish speech on the Internet, the 
effect of public figures’ ‘significantly greater access to the channels of effective 
communication’ is limited.” (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344)) (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 
844, 870 (1997) (“[A]ny person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that 
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.”)); see also PAUL SIEGEL, COMMUNICATION 
LAW IN AMERICA 495 (Molly Taylor & Karen Hanson eds., 2002) (stating that online plaintiffs 
“can reach an audience as large as the one exposed to the original defamation”); Doe v. Cahill, 
884 A.2d 451, 455-56 (Del. 2005) (“Through the [I]nternet, speakers can bypass mainstream 
media to speak directly to ‘an audience larger and more diverse than any the Framers could have 
imagined.’” (quoting Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in 
Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 895 (2000))). 
 22. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. 
 23. See O’Connor, supra note 21, at 525 (“In order to appropriately protect the private 
blogger from the heightened standard of actual malice that she would be required to prove as a 
limited-purpose public figure, it is necessary to give weight to the other prongs of the test—that 
is, whether there is an isolated controversy, whether the plaintiff has voluntarily thrust herself 
into the controversy, and so on—before jumping straight to the access to media prong.”). 
 24. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (“Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a 
public figure through no purposeful action of his own . . . .”). 
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Gertz defined as “assum[ing] roles of especial prominence in the 
affairs of society”25 or “thrust[ing] themselves to the forefront of 
particular public controversies.”26 Courts should avoid a voluntariness 
definition that encompasses simple operation and use of a social 
media site. Such an approach would convert millions of users into 
public figures in one fell swoop,27 which in turn would substantially 
decrease social media users’ chances at recovering for online 
defamation.28 This result would violate a major principle of Gertz,29 
as well as a main tenet of tort law: compensation for the victim.30  
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA)31 
makes the proper application of Gertz to social media platforms even 
more important. Section 230 immunizes Internet service providers 
from liability for the defamatory statements of users.32 As a result, 
social media users can only recover under defamation suits in suits 
against individual social media users, as opposed to a social media 
platform or operating system. Thus, to allow users a remedy, courts 
must cautiously structure the public figure doctrine to prevent all 
social media users from becoming public figures. However, courts 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Key Facts, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAreaId=22 
(last visited Feb. 29, 2012) (Facebook has more than 840 million monthly active users); Eric 
Ernest, Google Plus Users Number 40 Million and Counting, PCWORLD.IN (Oct. 24, 2011), 
http://www.pcworld.in/news/google-plus-users-number-40-million-and-counting-57162011 
(Google+ has more than forty million users); Chris Taylor, Social Networking “Utopia” Isn’t 
Coming, CNN (June 27, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-
27/tech/limits.social.networking.taylor_1_twitter-users-facebook-friends-
connections?_s=PM:TECH (Twitter has more than 300 million users). 
 28. Williams, supra note 3, at 502-03. 
 29. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341, 343 (“The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel 
is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood. . . . 
[W]e conclude that the state interest in compensating injury to the reputation of private 
individuals requires that a different rule should obtain with respect to them.”). 
 30. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 6 (W. 
Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (“The purpose of the law of torts is to adjust these losses, and to 
afford compensation for injuries sustained by one person as the result of the conduct of 
another.” (citing Cecil A. Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 238, 238 
(1944))). 
 31. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2011). 
 32. See Ciolli, supra note 13, at 275 (stating that courts have interpreted the statute to 
grant “broad immunity to [I]nternet service providers, website hosting services, mailing list 
operators, discussion board owners, and other electronic services covered by the statute”). 
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should also avoid completely rejecting the public figure doctrine in 
order to avoid chilling speech on social media platforms33 and, 
consequently, contradicting an important principle of the public figure 
doctrine34 and reducing the socially beneficial speech that derives 
from such platforms.35 
This Comment sets forth a workable public-figure test to apply 
to social media users that upholds the principles of Gertz. Courts 
should require defendants to overcome certain initial presumptions by 
clear and convincing evidence before designating a social media user 
an involuntary public figure or a general public figure. To overcome 
the presumption that the plaintiff is not an involuntary public figure, 
courts should require a defendant to provide clear and convincing 
proof that the plaintiff has greater access to the media than other users 
on the plaintiff’s social media network. Additionally, to overcome the 
presumption that the plaintiff is not a general public figure a 
defendant must offer clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff 
has general notoriety or notoriety within the social media platform. 
Moreover, when determining what constitutes voluntary activity on a 
social network for limited-purpose public figures, courts should 
consider social media an extension of a social media user’s private 
life. 
Part I of this Comment provides a working definition of what 
constitutes social media, the differences between social media and the 
Internet in general, and the social benefits that derive from speech on 
social media platforms. Part II gives a short analysis of Supreme 
 
 33. Kosseff, supra note 4, at 272. 
 34. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342 (“Some tension necessarily exists between the need for a 
vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury. . . . 
[But, i]n our continuing effort to define the proper accommodation between these competing 
concerns, we have been especially anxious to assure to the freedoms of speech and press that 
‘breathing space’ essential to their fruitful exercise.” (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 
433 (1963))); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (“A rule compelling the 
critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions—and to do so on pain 
of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount—leads to a comparable ‘self-censorship’. . . . 
Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their 
criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt 
whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so.”); id. at 300-01 
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (“The opinion of the Court conclusively demonstrates the chilling 
effect of the Alabama libel laws on First Amendment freedoms in the area of race relations.”). 
 35. See Shirky, supra note 5, at 29-33. 
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Court precedent on the public figure doctrine and a brief overview on 
lower courts’ application of this test. Part III examines the 
Communications Decency Act and how the act affects the remedies 
available to a plaintiff defamed by online speech. Part IV analyzes the 
problems that courts will experience when applying each public 
figure designation to the Internet. It next recommends that to best 
uphold the principles of Gertz, courts should require a defendant to 
overcome certain starting presumptions by clear and convincing proof 
when determining whether a social media plaintiff is a general or 
involuntary public figure. Part IV then suggests that courts define 
voluntary activity as deliberate, nonincidental contact with a public 
forum—that is, any forum in which the public can freely access 
information without encountering privacy restrictions.36 Although this 
definition includes social media profiles that users treat as 
“loudspeakers” instead of “mailboxes,” courts should avoid defining 
mere access of social media services as use of a public forum, and 
instead treat such access as an extension of the user’s private life. 
I. WHAT IS SOCIAL MEDIA? 
A. Defining Social Media 
Social media refers to more typical social media platforms37 and 
features that are considered general characteristics of these widely 
used services. These characteristics include a viewable profile listing 
personal characteristics and preferences,38 some kind of viewable list 
of contacts or “friends,”39 and the ability for one social media user to 
 
 36. See infra notes 281-84 and accompanying text. 
 37. Good examples of more typical social media networks include the three major social 
media networks: LinkedIn, Facebook, and Twitter. See Lauren McCoy, 140 Characters or Less: 
Maintaining Privacy and Publicity in the Age of Social Networking, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 
203, 210 n.43 (2010) (citing Don Bulmer, The Big Three Social Networks Have Emerged as 
Professional Networks: Linkedin, Facebook, and Twitter, SOCIALMEDIATODAY (Nov. 19, 
2009), http://www.socialmediatoday.com/SMC/143975 (stating that the most popular social 
media platforms are LinkedIn, Facebook, and Twitter)). 
 38. Boyd & Ellison, supra note 11, at 213 (“The public display of connections is a crucial 
component of [social network sites]. The Friends list contains links to each Friend’s profile, 
enabling viewers to traverse the network graph by clicking through the Friends lists. On most 
sites, the list of Friends is visible to anyone who is permitted to view the profile . . . .”). 
 39. Id. at 211 (“While [social network sites] have implemented a wide variety of 
technical features, their backbone consists of visible profiles that display an articulated list of 
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post comments or statements on the profile of another user.40 Social 
media platforms may also include some more advanced 
characteristics, most notably video and photo sharing capabilities.41 
The defining feature of social media is the fact that users can modify 
their privacy settings to allow or restrict public access to their pages.42 
B. Distinguishing Social Media from Other Internet Media 
Social media is a unique feature of the Internet. For this reason, 
other articles discussing the public figure doctrine and its legal 
consequences for other types of Internet platforms are inapplicable to 
social media. Social media differs from the rest of the Internet in three 
major ways. One distinguishing feature is that social media has 
internal privacy mechanisms.43 These mechanisms give the user a 
range of privacy options, from making all of their information 
publicly available to restricting access to an exclusive group of 
predetermined users.44 The ability to limit access on social media 
differs from the generally open nature of the Internet. While private 
blogs and web pages may offer this opportunity to users, these forums 
do not offer another distinguishing social media characteristic: the 
sheer number of people participating in a structured online 
community45 with each user possessing identical web capabilities.46 
The third difference between social media and other Internet 
platforms is the public expectations of these forums. Many see social 
 
Friends who are also users of the system.”) (footnote omitted). 
 40. Id. at 213 (“Most [social network sites] also provide a mechanism for users to leave 
messages on their Friends’ profiles. This feature typically involves leaving ‘comments,’ 
although sites employ various labels for this feature.”). 
 41. Id. at 214 (“Beyond profiles, Friends, comments, and private messaging, [social 
network sites] vary greatly in their features and user base. Some have photo-sharing or video-
sharing capabilities; others have built-in blogging and instant messaging technology.”). 
 42. Id. at 211 (“What makes social network sites unique is not that they allow individuals 
to meet strangers, but rather that they enable users to articulate and make visible their social 
networks. This can result in connections between individuals that would not otherwise be 
made . . . .”); see also Data Use Policy, supra note 11; Twitter Privacy Policy, supra note 11. 
 43. See Data Use Policy, supra note 11; Twitter Privacy Policy, supra note 11; see also 
Boyd & Ellison, supra note 11, at 213 (“The visibility of a profile varies by site and according 
to user discretion.”). 
 44. See Data Use Policy, supra note 11; Twitter Privacy Policy, supra note 11. 
 45. See sources cited supra note 27. 
 46. See Boyd & Ellison, supra note 11, at 211-14. 
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media platforms as an extension of their social life in the material 
world.47 These three dissimilarities create a unique challenge for 
applying the public figure doctrine in the social media context. 
C. The Social Benefits of Social Media 
Social media also provides an important benefit to society. 
Although some critics have claimed that social media has a limited 
social benefit,48 many examples exist that rebut this claim. For 
example, social media has played a pivotal role in political campaigns 
in the United States.49 Social networks also had an important role in 
several political movements throughout the world, including most 
notably the Arab Spring.50 Most recently, social media use has helped 
proliferate information about the human rights violations in Syria.51 
These incidents provide only a few examples of the numerous 
occasions in which social media use has played a key role in an 
important social or political event or movement by helping organize 
or disseminate ideas throughout the group.52 As a result, courts should 
avoid policies that might chill speech on social media platforms when 
deciding how to apply doctrine to social media platforms. 
II. THE PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE 
Before considering how to apply the public figure doctrine to 
 
 47. See id. at 211, 221 (“On many of the large [social networking sites], participants are 
not necessarily ‘networking’ or looking to meet new people; instead, they are primarily 
communicating with people who are already a part of their extended social network. . . . 
Although exceptions exist, the available research suggests that most [social networking sites] 
primarily support pre-existing social relations.”). 
 48. See Malcolm Gladwell, Small Change, NEW YORKER, Oct. 4, 2010, at 40-42, 
available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell. 
 49. See Beth Fouhy, Elections 2012: The Social Network, Presidential Campaign 
Edition, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 17, 2011, 5:30 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/17/elections-2012-social-media_n_850172.html. 
 50. See, e.g., Philip N. Howard et al., Opening Closed Regimes: What Was the Role of 
Social Media During the Arab Spring? (Project on Info. Tech. & Political Islam, Working Paper 
No. 2011.1, 2011), available at http://pitpi.org/?p=1051 (follow download hyperlink); Anne 
Alexander, Internet Role in Egypt’s Protests, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
middle-east-12400319 (last updated Feb. 9, 2011, 1:00 AM). 
 51. See Anthony Shadid, With Internet, Exiles Shape World’s Image of Syria Revolt, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2011, at A1. 
 52. See Shirky, supra note 5, at 29-33. 
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social media, it is instructive to review the current state of defamation 
law to highlight potentially troublesome aspects of the doctrine. 
Under the Second Restatement of Torts, the plaintiff satisfies the 
elements of defamation by proving that (1) the defendant published a 
statement to a third party (2) that is a false defamatory statement 
concerning the plaintiff, (3) the defendant’s fault at least amounts to 
negligence, and (4) the statement caused damage to the plaintiff.53 In 
order to establish the defendant negligently made the statement, the 
plaintiff must prove that the defendant failed to verify the truth of the 
statement.54 The public figure doctrine, however, changes the 
threshold liability that the plaintiff must prove in order to recover.55 If 
a plaintiff qualifies as a public figure, he must prove the defendant 
acted with “actual malice” when making the defamatory statement, 
which is defined as “reckless disregard for the truth.”56 It is not 
entirely clear when an individual acquires public figure status. An 
analysis of the public figure doctrine, as well as cases explaining the 
doctrine, illustrates the confusion surrounding the public figure 
doctrine. 
A. Supreme Court Precedent 
1. New York Times and Gertz 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan57 is the starting point for 
American defamation law and the public figure doctrine.58 New York 
 
 53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1976); Quin S. Landon, Note, The First 
Amendment and Speech-Based Torts: Recalibrating the Balance, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 157, 163 
(2011) (“To prevail in a defamation action a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) a 
false and defamatory statement was made against another; (2) an unprivileged publication of the 
statement was made to a third party; (3) if the defamatory matter is of public concern, fault 
amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) damage to the plaintiff.” 
(citing Aaron Larson, Defamation, Law, and Slander, EXPERTLAW (Aug. 2003), 
http://www.expertlaw.com/library/personal_injury/defamation.html)). 
 54. SACK, supra note 9, § 6:2.1. 
 55. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974). 
 56. See id. at 328, 342-43 (“Under [the New York Times v. Sullivan] rule respondent 
would escape liability unless petitioner could prove publication of defamatory falsehood ‘with 
“actual malice”—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether 
it was false or not.’” (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964))). 
 57. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 58. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 2:1 (2d ed. 2012). 
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Times involved a defamation lawsuit by an elected official of 
Montgomery, Alabama, against the New York Times after the Times 
published an advertisement criticizing Montgomery for the city’s role 
in the civil rights movement.59 In finding in favor of the Times, the 
Supreme Court extended First Amendment principles to defamation 
law by holding that individuals classified as “public officials” must 
prove “actual malice,” instead of negligence, to recover for 
defamatory speech.60 The Court based its decision on the premise that 
defamation law would have a chilling effect on free speech if a person 
critical of public officials would have to guarantee the truth of all his 
statements.61 The Court based its conclusion on the presumption that 
the risk of civil liability would force people being critical of “official 
conduct” to self-censor.62 The majority explained that such censoring 
would detract from the “debate on public issues,” which “should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” and “may well include 
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on 
government and public officials.”63 
The Supreme Court expanded the actual malice standard to 
public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts64 and Associated 
Press v. Walker65 in plurality opinions; however, Gertz v. Welch was 
the first case in which the Court officially set forth guidelines and a 
rationale for determining public figure status.66 In Gertz, an attorney 
sued a publisher of a magazine who wrote an article claiming the 
attorney was a communist.67 The publisher argued the attorney was a 
public official or a public figure and thus “entitled to invoke the 
privilege enunciated in New York Times.”68 In refusing to find that the 
lawyer fell into either of these designations, the Court effectively 
outlined the public figure doctrine.69 
 
 59. See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 256-60. 
 60. See id. at 283-84 n.24. 
 61. See id. at 279; id. at 300-01 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 62. See id. at 279 (majority opinion); id. at 300-01 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 63. Id. at 270 (majority opinion). 
 64. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
 65. Id. 
 66. SMOLLA, supra note 58, §§ 2:11-12. 
 67. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 326-27 (1974). 
 68. Id. at 327. 
 69. Id. at 344. 
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The Court explained the public figure doctrine rests on two 
major foundations70: the individual’s access to the media71 and the 
individual’s assumption of risk of injury.72 The majority argued that 
both public officials and public figures have “significantly greater 
access to the channels of effective communication” and can thus rebut 
false statements more effectively than private individuals.73 The Court 
also reasoned that public figures have assumed an “increased risk of 
injury” from defamatory statements by voluntarily assuming a role of 
fame or influence in society.74 
After explaining its rationale, the Court proceeded to identify at 
least two, and perhaps three,75 types of public figures: general public 
figures, limited-purpose public figures, and involuntary public 
figures.76 According to the majority, general public figures attain 
public figure status by voluntarily assuming a role of “especial 
prominence” in society.77 In comparison, limited-purpose public 
figures reach public status when they “thrust themselves” into a 
specific public controversy in order to influence the outcome.78 
Although some controversy remains about the existence of 
involuntary public figures,79 the Gertz Court also left open the 
possibility of their existence.80 However, the majority pointed out that 
such cases would be few and far between.81 Finally, the Court made a 
 
 70. Id. at 344-45; SMOLLA, supra note 58, § 2:13. 
 71. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344; SMOLLA, supra note 58, § 2:13. 
 72. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345; SMOLLA, supra note 58, § 2:14. 
 73. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344. 
 74. Id. at 345. 
 75. W. Wat Hopkins, The Involuntary Public Figure: Not So Dead After All, 21 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 21 (2003) (“[T]here is disagreement as to whether the Supreme 
Court identified two or three categories of public figure status.”). 
 76. SMOLLA, supra note 58, §§ 2:14, 2:33. 
 77. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (“[T]hose who attain this status have assumed roles of especial 
prominence in the affairs of society.”). 
 78. Id. (“More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the 
forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues 
involved.”). 
 79. Hopkins, supra note 75, at 21. 
 80. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (“[I]t may be possible for someone to become a public figure 
through no purposeful action of his own . . . .”). 
 81. Id. (“[I]t may be possible for someone to become a public figure through no 
purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be 
exceedingly rare.”) (emphasis added). 
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point to eschew a bright-line rule or a case-by-case approach and 
instead indicated a preference for developing broad principles when 
determining public figure status.82 
2. Subsequent Supreme Court Cases 
Gertz provided the general outline of the public figure doctrine, 
and later Supreme Court cases shed light on its precise definition. 
Two years after Gertz, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone,83 Mary Alice 
Firestone filed a defamation suit after Time published defamatory 
material about her divorce from Russell Firestone, a descendant of the 
wealthy Firestone family.84 Time argued that it did not act with the 
requisite intent of actual malice to incur liability because Mrs. 
Firestone was a public figure.85 The majority refused to find Mrs. 
Firestone was a general or limited-purpose public figure and, in the 
process, elucidated the public figure doctrine.86 The Court noted that 
an individual needed more than merely local notoriety to be a public 
figure.87 The Court also expressed a concern about adopting a broad 
definition of a public figure that would encapsulate too large a class 
of people.88 It therefore refused to define public controversy as any 
debate or issue that concerned a subject of public interest.89 The Court 
also displayed great deference to the Gertz voluntariness requirement 
by relying on Mrs. Firestone’s lack of voluntary action to decide she 
 
 82. See id. at 343, 346 (“Because an ad hoc resolution of the competing interests at stake 
in each particular case is not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of general application. . . . 
Nor does the Constitution require us to draw so thin a line between the drastic alternatives of the 
New York Times privilege and the common law of strict liability for defamatory error.”). 
 83. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
 84. Id. at 450-52. 
 85. Id. at 452-53. 
 86. Id. at 453 (“Respondent did not assume any role of especial prominence in the affairs 
of society, other than perhaps Palm Beach society, and she did not thrust herself to the forefront 
of any particular public controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved in 
it.”). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 456-57 (“It may be argued that there is still room for application of the New 
York Times protections to more narrowly focused reports of what actually transpires in the 
courtroom. But even so narrowed, the suggested privilege is simply too broad.”). 
 89. Id. at 454 (“[P]etitioner seeks to equate ‘public controversy’ with all controversies of 
interest to the public . . . . Dissolution of a marriage through judicial proceedings is not the sort 
of ‘public controversy’ referred to in Gertz . . . .”). 
LAFFERMAN 11/26/2012  5:07 PM 
2012] APPLYING GERTZ TO SOCIAL MEDIA 215 
 
was not a public figure of any sort.90 
Subsequent Supreme Court cases, Wolston v. Reader’s Digest 
Association91 and Hutchinson v. Proxmire,92 further developed the 
boundaries of the public figure doctrine. In Wolston, the Court refused 
to find that an individual who failed to appear in a grand jury hearing 
investigating Soviet intelligence activities in the United States was a 
public figure.93 The Court reiterated its definition of a public 
controversy stated in Firestone: “A private individual is not 
automatically transformed into a public figure just by becoming 
involved in or associated with a matter that attracts public 
attention.”94 On the other hand, Hutchinson involved a suit brought by 
an adjunct professor against a U.S. Senator who criticized the 
professor’s federal spending as unreasonably excessive.95 The Court 
refused to find that the professor was a public figure partly because of 
its concern for crafting a rule that encompasses too large a class of 
people.96 The majority explicitly stated that if it concluded the 
professor was a public figure, “everyone who received or benefited 
from the myriad public grants for research could be classified as a 
public figure—a conclusion that our previous opinions have 
rejected.”97 Both Wolston and Hutchinson emphasized the need to 
identify some voluntary action taken by the plaintiff before finding 
the plaintiff is a public figure.98 
 
 90. See id. (“Nor did respondent freely choose to publicize issues as to the propriety of 
her married life.”). 
 91. Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979). 
 92. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). 
 93. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 159-61. 
 94. Id. at 167. 
 95. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 114-15. 
 96. Id. at 135 (“[I]t is not sufficient to make Hutchinson a public figure. If it were, 
everyone who received or benefited from the myriad public grants for research could be 
classified as a public figure—a conclusion that our previous opinions have rejected.”). 
 97. Id. 
 98. See id. at 135 (“Hutchinson did not thrust himself or his views into public controversy 
to influence others.”); Wolston, 443 U.S. at 166 (“[T]he undisputed facts do not justify the 
conclusion of the District Court and Court of Appeals that petitioner ‘voluntarily thrust’ or 
‘injected’ himself into the forefront of the public controversy surrounding the investigation of 
Soviet espionage in the United States.”). 
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B. Lower Court Application of the Public Figure Doctrine 
Despite the Supreme Court’s efforts, lower courts continue to 
experience difficulty applying the public figure doctrine. In fact, one 
court has complained that the Supreme Court has not “fleshed out” 
the difference between a public figure and private person.99 In light of 
the gaps remaining in the public figure doctrine, lower courts have 
shaped much of its finer contours.100 Most lower courts have 
supported a plain reading of Gertz, and found Gertz can support three 
different public figure designations: general public figures, limited-
purpose public figures, and involuntary public figures.101 Lower 
courts have established a large variety of tests for each of these 
designations.102 This Comment will focus on the general features or 
potentially problematic tests for each designation. 
1. General Public Figures 
Courts have generally required that an individual assume a level 
of notoriety in society before concluding the individual is a public 
figure.103 Within the constructs of this test, courts have interpreted an 
assumption of risk to be some form of voluntary action on the 
plaintiff’s behalf.104 Most have defined voluntary activity as actually 
seeking and obtaining notoriety.105 However, some courts have 
 
 99. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 100. Ciolli, supra note 13, at 266 (“Because the Supreme Court’s most recent public figure 
decisions have failed to clarify the Gertz framework, lower courts have developed most of 
contemporary public figure doctrine.” (citing Erik Walker, Comment, Defamation Law: Public 
Figures—Who Are They?, 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 955, 977 (1993))). 
 101. Hopkins, supra note 75, at 21 (“[T]here is disagreement as to whether the Supreme 
Court identified two or three categories of public figure status. . . . [A] number of courts have 
recognized—either explicitly or implicitly—that the involuntary public figure is one of three 
types of public figures identified by the Gertz Court.”). 
 102. Walker, supra note 100, at 971 (“The tension between Gertz and subsequent Supreme 
Court decisions has produced inconsistent lower court holdings.”). 
 103. See SACK, supra note 9, § 5:3.2; SMOLLA, supra note 58, § 2:80. 
 104. See Hopkins, supra note 75, at 25-26. 
 105. See, e.g., Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1976) (finding 
Johnny Carson a public figure); Loeb v. Globe Newspaper Co., 489 F. Supp. 481, 485-86 (D. 
Mass. 1980) (finding the Globe Newspaper a general purpose public figure); Reliance Ins. Co. 
v. Barron’s, 442 F. Supp. 1341, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding a billion dollar corporation an 
all-purpose public figure); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 423-25 (1983) 
(finding Clint Eastwood a general purpose public figure), superseded by statute, CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 3344 (West 2010); Ithaca Coll. v. Yale Daily News Publ’g Co., 433 N.Y.S.2d 530, 533-
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interpreted the assumption of risk to include behavior from which 
publicity inevitably results,106 such as marrying a famous television-
show personality107 or a music star.108 
In regards to notoriety, most lower courts have set a high bar for 
an individual to be considered notorious in society.109 Upon first 
glance it seems that an individual or entity must be a household name 
to achieve general public figure status, which has included the likes of 
Johnny Carson,110 Clint Eastwood,111 Carroll Burnett,112 Jerry 
Falwell,113 Ithaca College,114 the Globe Newspaper,115 and even a 
billion dollar corporation, Reliance Insurance.116 However, courts 
have also found individuals to be general public figures when they 
experience notoriety within a smaller community or context.117 Courts 
have found individuals to obtain notoriety when they gained fame or 
renown in narrow contextual situations, such as within the surfing 
community,118 inside a particular metropolitan ethnic community,119 
 
34 (1980) (finding Ithaca College a general purpose public figure),  aff’d, 85 A.D.2d 817 (1981); 
see also SACK, supra note 9, § 5:3.2; SMOLLA, supra note 58, § 2:80. 
 106. See James Corbelli, Comment, Fame and Notoriety in Defamation Litigation, 34 
HASTINGS L.J. 809, 816 n.46 (1983) (“Although there is language in Gertz that appears to 
require ‘persuasive power and influence,’ . . . some lower courts have interpreted Gertz to allow 
a finding of public figure status based solely on fame.”) (citation omitted). 
 107. See Carson, 529 F.2d at 209 (finding Johnny Carson’s wife a public figure). 
 108. See Brewer v. Memphis Publ’g Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1255 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding 
Elvis Presley’s girlfriend a public figure). 
 109. See Carson, 529 F.2d at 209 (finding Johnny Carson a public figure); Falwell v. 
Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204, 1208 (W.D. Va. 1981) (finding Reverend Jerry Falwell 
a general public figure); Reliance Ins. Co., 442 F. Supp. at 1348 (finding a billion dollar 
corporation an all-purpose public figure); Burnett v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 
1008 (1983) (finding Carroll Burnett a general public figure); Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 
423-25 (finding Clint Eastwood a general purpose public figure); see also SMOLLA, supra note 
58, § 2:81. 
 110. Carson, 529 F.2d at 209. 
 111. See Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 423-25. 
 112. Burnett, 144 Cal. App. 3d at 1008. 
 113. Falwell, 521 F. Supp. at 1208. 
 114. Ithaca Coll. v. Yale Daily News Publ’g Co., 433 N.Y.S.2d 530, 533-34 (1980), aff’d, 
85 A.D.2d 817 (1981). 
 115. Loeb v. Globe Newspaper Co., 489 F. Supp. 481, 485-86 (D. Mass. 1980). 
 116. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron’s, 422 F. Supp. 1341, 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
 117. See SMOLLA, supra note 58, §§ 2:51-52. 
 118. Chapman v. Journal Concepts, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1095 (D. Haw. 2007), 
aff’d, 401 F. App’x 243 (9th Cir. 2010). 
LAFFERMAN  11/26/2012  5:07 PM 
218 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 29 
 
or within a city’s sports community.120 Moreover, courts have also 
found a party to be a general public figure when the person gains 
notoriety in a specific geographic area.121 These cases have found 
individuals public figures when an individual gains notoriety in 
regions like Alabama,122 Montana,123 and even smaller localities, such 
as the University of Minnesota.124 This contextual notoriety presents 
particular problem when applied to social media platforms where 
users can freely segregate themselves into communities or groups of 
connections.125 The different tests for notoriety and assumption of 
notoriety under the general public figure test make it important that 
courts analyze the doctrine’s application to social media to determine 
the potential positive or negative effects of such application. 
2. Limited-Purpose Public Figures 
The limited-purpose public figure test is conceivably the most 
frequently used test within the public figure doctrine.126 Although 
there are many different types of tests available for determining a 
limited-purpose public figure, generally the test can be broken into 
two parts: (1) a preexisting public controversy (2) that the plaintiff 
influences through his voluntary actions.127 
Lower courts have adopted a wide variety of approaches to 
 
 119. Celle v. Filipino Reporter Enters. Inc., 209 F.3d 163, 177 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 120. Brooks v. Paige, 773 P.2d 1098, 1099 (Colo. App. 1988). 
 121. See Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. Faulkner, 372 So. 2d 1282, 1285-86 (Ala. 1979); 
Nelson v. Univ. of Minn., No. 92-3599, 1993 WL 610729, at *3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 25, 1993); 
Williams v. Pasma, 656 P.2d 212, 216 (Mont. 1982). 
 122. Mobile Press Register, 372 So. 2d at 1285-86. 
 123. Williams, 656 P.2d at 216. 
 124. Nelson, 1993 WL 610729, at *3. Note that the court found the plaintiff to be a 
limited-purpose public figure, and not a general purpose public figure, based on his notoriety at 
the University of Minnesota. Id. 
 125. See Boyd & Ellison, supra note 11, at 218-19. 
 126. Marcone v. Penthouse Int’l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1082 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(“More common are individuals deemed public figures only in the context of a particular public 
dispute.”). 
 127. See, e.g., Mandel v. Bos. Phoenix, Inc., 456 F.3d 198, 202 (1st Cir. 2006); Reuber v. 
Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 708 (4th Cir. 1991); Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. N.Y. 
Times Co., 842 F.2d 612, 617-18 (2d Cir. 1988); Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1072, 1082; Clark v. 
Am. Broad. Cos., 684 F.2d 1208, 1217-18 (6th Cir. 1982); Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 
627 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also SMOLLA, supra note 58, § 2:22. 
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determine what constitutes voluntary action.128 The approaches can be 
distilled into two general methods129 that mirror the assumption-of-
risk approach for general public figures.130 Under the first approach, 
an individual acts voluntarily when he takes definitive and assertive 
action to influence a controversy.131 Examples of this behavior range 
from a scientist trying to advocate a particular viewpoint132 to a 
builder promoting his business.133 Under the second approach, actions 
that are merely likely to result in influence or publicity constitute 
voluntary action.134 Courts differ when finding what behavior satisfies 
this test. The Third Circuit found an attorney should have known 
publicity would result from his actions after he represented a 
motorcycle gang involved in drug trafficking.135 However, the Fifth 
Circuit held a mobster acted voluntarily when he “engaged in a course 
[of activity] that was bound to invite attention.”136 
Similar diversity exists in the lower courts’ approaches to the 
public controversy requirement. Aside from adopting a case-by-case 
interpretation,137 courts have generally adopted two interpretations of 
a public controversy.138 More often, courts have held a public 
controversy exists when controversy affects members of the public 
other than the litigants in the case.139 A prime example of such a test 
 
 128. SMOLLA, supra note 58, § 2:31 n.11 (“The voluntariness element is truly an example 
of the existence of authorities ‘too numerous to mention,’ for almost no case dealing with the 
public figure classification problem fails to discuss it.”); Hopkins, supra note 75, at 24 (“One 
court held, for example, that while voluntariness is important to public figure status, ‘what is 
and is not voluntary is by no means self-evident.’” (quoting Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 
619 F. Supp. 684, 703 (D.N.J. 1985))). 
 129. See Walker, supra note 100, at 972-73. 
 130. See supra text accompanying notes 81-84. 
 131. Walker, supra note 100, at 973 (“[O]ther decisions suggest that an individual must 
actively seek public attention in order to meet the voluntariness requirement of Gertz.”). 
 132. See, e.g., Reuber, 925 F.2d at 710. 
 133. See, e.g., Carr v. Forbes, Inc., 259 F.3d 273, 280-81 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 134. See Marcone v. Penthouse Int’l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1083 (3d Cir. 
1985); Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 580 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Walker, 
supra note 100, at 972-73. 
 135. Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1086. 
 136. Rosanova, 580 F.2d at 861 (quoting trial court decision). 
 137. Note, Defining a Public Controversy in the Constitutional Law of Defamation, 69 
VA. L. REV. 931, 944 (1983). 
 138. See SACK, supra note 9, § 5:3.3; SMOLLA, supra note 58, § 2:29. 
 139. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
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is the public controversy test utilized in Waldbaum v. Fairchild 
Publications, Inc.140 In Waldbaum, the D.C. Circuit held that a story 
about a CEO being dismissed from the second largest cooperative in 
the nation constituted a public controversy because the company’s 
“pathbreaking marketing policies” started a debate which 
encapsulated “consumers and retailers in the Washington area.”141 
The second variation of the public controversy test requires that the 
situations at issue be likely to draw publicity.142 For example, the 
Third Circuit has found “that a dispute over a professional football 
player’s ability is a public controversy because such an issue is 
always newsworthy.”143 The variety of approaches under the limited-
purpose public figure doctrine indicates it is as equally muddled as 
the general public figure doctrine. 
An important distinction between the limited-purpose public 
figure doctrine and the general public figure doctrine is that a public 
figure plaintiff only needs to meet the actual malice standard 
regarding the statements made within the context of the 
controversy.144 In contrast, the general public figure doctrine extends 
the actual malice standard to all statements made by the public figure 
plaintiff.145 This difference is an important aspect for courts to 
consider when applying this doctrine to social media because of the 
potential implications of this test on a defendant’s liability. 
3. Involuntary Public Figures 
The last, and most controversial, public figure designation from 
Gertz is the involuntary public figure. Courts have used this doctrine 
so sparingly that some courts and commentators have questioned its 
existence altogether.146 When courts adopted the involuntary public 
 
 140. See id. at 1297-98. 
 141. Id. at 1299. 
 142. Walker, supra note 100, at 969-70. 
 143. Id. (citing Chuy v. Phila. Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1280 (3d Cir. 1979)). 
 144. SMOLLA, supra note 58, § 2:78 (“The only difference between [public figures and 
limited-purpose public figures] is that the actual malice test applies to limited public figures 
only with regard to speech connected to the public controversy out of which the public figure 
status arises, whereas the pervasive public figure is subject to the actual malice test in all 
defamation actions.”). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 538 (4th Cir. 1999) (“So rarely have courts determined 
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figure designation, they took two general approaches.147 
Courts often considered the involuntary public figure to be a 
separate public figure designation.148 For example, consider Dameron 
v. Washington Magazine, Inc.,149 where an air traffic controller sued 
Washington Magazine for defamation after the magazine asserted he 
was among the air traffic controllers who were to blame for an 
airplane crash that killed ninety-two people.150 The D.C. Circuit 
agreed with the district court’s determination that the air traffic 
controller was not a limited-purpose or general purpose public figure 
because he never “injected” himself into the controversy.151 However, 
the court held the air traffic controller was an involuntary public 
figure.152 The court based its finding on the fact that the air traffic 
controller assumed a role of special prominence in a public 
controversy, albeit by “sheer bad luck” of being the “controller on 
duty at the time of the . . . crash.”153 Other courts that have employed 
this doctrine have adopted a similar approach to that of Dameron, 
requiring only that the plaintiff obtain a high level of publicity, either 
within a specific controversy154 or in general.155 
However, some courts consider the involuntary public figure to 
be a subset of the limited-purpose public figure or general public 
figure designations.156 The Third Circuit best explained this rationale 
 
that an individual was an involuntary public figure that commentators have questioned the 
continuing existence of that category.”); Hopkins, supra note 75, at 18 (stating that “one 
commentator pointed out that ‘rare’ appeared to be a euphemism for ‘nonexistent’” (quoting Nat 
Stern, Unresolved Antitheses of the Limited Public Figure Doctrine, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1027, 
1092 (1996))). 
 147. Hopkins, supra note 75, at 21-28. 
 148. Id. at 21-22. 
 149. Dameron v. Wash. Magazine, Inc., 779 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 150. Id. at 738. 
 151. Id. at 740-41. 
 152. Id. at 743. 
 153. Id. at 742. 
 154. See, e.g., Foretich v. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1099, 1107-08 
(D.C. Cir. 1991); Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 186 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2001); Daniel Goldreyer, Ltd. v. Dow Jones & Co., 259 A.D.2d 353, 353 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1999); Bay View Packing Co. v. Taff, 543 N.W.2d 522, 532-33 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). 
 155. See, e.g., Zupnik v. Associated Press, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 70, 73 (D. Conn. 1998). 
 156. Hopkins, supra note 75, at 23 (stating that the Third Circuit has held that “there are 
not three categories of public figure status, but that ‘involuntariness’ is merely one means 
through which a libel plaintiff becomes a public figure”); see also Grossman v. Smart, 807 F. 
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when it stated that “rather than creating a separate class of public 
figures, we view such a description as merely one way an individual 
may come to be considered a general or limited purpose public 
figure.”157 Thus, based on this approach, an individual can still 
become a general or limited-purpose public figure involuntarily.158 
Nevertheless, although courts have sparingly used the involuntary 
public figure doctrine,159 they should consider the role the test plays 
when considering how to apply the public figure doctrine to social 
media. 
III. THE LACK OF AVAILABLE REMEDIES—SECTION 230 OF THE 
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT 
Application of the public figure doctrine to social media is 
particularly important because current statutory online defamation 
law severely limits the remedy available to plaintiffs.160 Today, online 
defamation law is largely controlled by Section 230 of the CDA, 
which was meant to overrule cases like Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy 
Services Co.161 In Stratton Oakmont, a New York state court 
considered whether an online service provider should be liable after 
an unknown person posted defamatory statements on one of the 
service provider’s computer bulletin boards.162 The posting stated an 
investment banking firm’s securities offering was “major criminal 
fraud,” the firm’s president was “soon to be proven criminal,” and 
Stratton brokers “lie[d] for a living or get fired.”163 The court found 
the service provider liable pursuant to the common law rule that 
 
Supp. 1404, 1409 (C.D. Ill. 1992). 
 157. Marcone v. Penthouse Int’l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1084 n.9 (3d Cir. 
1985). 
 158. Id.; see also Walker, supra note 100, at 972. 
 159. Hopkins, supra note 75, at 21 (“[O]ver the quarter-century following Gertz, some 
twenty-three courts have struggled with the involuntary public figure doctrine in more than 
thirty cases, identifying plaintiffs as involuntary public figures nine times.”). 
 160. See SIEGEL, supra note 21, at 494; Ciolli, supra note 13, at 275 (stating that courts 
have interpreted the statute to grant “broad immunity to [I]nternet service providers, website 
hosting services, mailing list operators, discussion board owners, and other electronic services 
covered by the statute”). 
 161. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2011). 
 162. Id. at *1. 
 163. Id. 
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subjects those who repeat or republish defamatory statements to 
liability.164 
In response to this decision, Congress decided to eschew the 
common law approach by passing the CDA.165 Congress passed this 
legislation with the purpose of overruling Stratton Oakmont and other 
similar cases166 because these decisions could hamper the growth of 
the Internet and the “vibrant and competitive free market that 
presently exists for the Internet.”167 
Section 230 is responsible for shaping the current state of online 
defamation.168 The applicable language in this section states that “[n]o 
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as 
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”169 This statement has widely been read 
to absolve online service providers of liability “even when the 
Internet company clearly intended to benefit from the rhetorical 
excesses of those subscribers.”170 Subsequent cases have supported 
this broad interpretation of Section 230.171 Moreover, courts have 
found or indicated that social media platforms fall within the 
definition of an Internet service provider.172 One such case is Doe v. 
 
 164. Id. at *4-5. 
 165. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2011). 
 166. H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“[S]ection [230] provides ‘Good 
Samaritan’ protections from civil liability for providers . . . of an interactive computer service 
for actions to restrict . . . access to objectionable online material. One of the specific purposes of 
this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which 
have treated such providers . . . as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because 
they have restricted access to objectionable material.”). 
 167. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)-(2) (2011) (“It is the policy of the United States . . . to promote 
the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other 
interactive media [and] . . . to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently 
exists for the Internet . . . .”); see also Perzanowski, supra note 14, at 854 n.137 (“At common 
law ‘every one who takes part in the publication, as in the case of the owner, editor, printer, 
vendor, or even carrier of a newspaper is charged with publication.’” (quoting KEETON ET AL., 
supra note 30, at 799)). 
 168. See ASHLEY PACKARD, DIGITAL MEDIA LAW 195-96 (2010); ANDREW B. SERWIN ET 
AL., PRIVACY, SECURITY AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT: AN OVERVIEW § 4:4, at 49-50 
(2011); SIEGEL, supra note 21, at 444-45. 
 169. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2011). 
 170. SIEGEL, supra note 21, at 494. 
 171. See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2003); Zeran v. Am. 
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 172. See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008); see also SERWIN ET 
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MySpace, Inc.173 In Doe, the plaintiff sued MySpace for failing to 
“implement basic safety measures to prevent sexual predators from 
communicating with minors on its Web site.”174 In finding for the 
defendant, the Fifth Circuit found MySpace to constitute an Internet 
service provider.175 Thus, because Section 230 bestowed immunity on 
the social media platform, the court found plaintiffs “may sue the 
third-party user who generated the content, but not the interactive 
computer service that enabled them to publish the content online.”176 
Doe indicated not only that courts will consider social media 
platforms Internet service providers, but also that they are immune 
from suits alleging negligence for failure to adequately operate 
internal safety measures.177 Another part of Section 230 immunizes 
Internet service providers from potential liability stemming from “any 
action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to . . . obscene, 
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally 
protected . . . .”178 By immunizing Internet service providers from 
liability, Section 230 prevents social media users from obtaining a 
remedy from a social media platform that negligently operates its 
internal safety measures. 
Section 230 has complicated online defamation and narrowed 
plaintiffs’ available remedies to include only direct defamation 
lawsuits against the speaker.179 Although many scholars have 
 
AL., supra note 168, §4:4, at 49-50. Cases where courts have found blogs to be an Internet 
service provider are also informative on this issue because of the similar features between blogs 
and social media platforms. For that reason, see Dimeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523, 527-32 
(E.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d, 248 F. App’x 280 (3d Cir. 2007); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 
50-53 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 173. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d at 413. 
 174. Id. at 416. 
 175. Id. at 419. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See id. at 419; see also SERWIN ET AL., supra note 168, §4:4, at 47, 49-50 (stating that 
the CDA immunizes the Internet provider in all circumstances except for when the “service 
provider contributes to the content”). 
 178. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2011). 
 179. See Ciolli, supra note 13, at 275 (stating that courts have interpreted the statute to 
grant “broad immunity to [I]nternet service providers, website hosting services, mailing list 
operators, discussion board owners, and other electronic services covered by the statute”); 
SIEGEL, supra note 21, at 494. 
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different views of the main purpose of tort law, almost everyone can 
agree that providing a remedy to a wronged individual plays a large 
role.180 Thus, when developing a test that applies the public figure 
doctrine to social media, courts must ensure the test provides an 
adequate remedy to plaintiffs in order to uphold this important tort 
law principle. 
IV. APPLYING THE PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE TO SOCIAL MEDIA 
This Comment analyzes potential legal and policy implications 
that arise when applying the public figure doctrine to social media by 
evaluating each public figure designation individually. To best 
enhance understanding of the doctrine’s application, this Section first 
considers involuntary public figures, then general public figures, and, 
finally, limited-purpose public figures, before recommending an 
approach for courts to consider when applying the public figure 
doctrine to social media. This Comment then recommends an 
approach to follow when applying the involuntary public figure and 
general public figure doctrine to social media. Finally, it analyzes 
certain approaches courts have taken when applying the public figure 
doctrine to the Internet in general to ascertain the best approach to 
identifying and defining what constitutes voluntary activity on social 
media. 
A. Background Principles 
When applying the public figure doctrine to social media, courts 
should uphold several general background principles. First, courts 
must be faithful to the binding precedent of Gertz and its progeny.181 
Second, they must provide the plaintiff with an adequate remedy.182 
This involves balancing the First Amendment concerns about chilling 
speech against the plaintiff’s need for a remedy in online 
defamation.183 Accordingly, courts should avoid bestowing 
 
 180. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, at 6 (“The purpose of the law of torts is to adjust 
these losses, and to afford compensation for injuries sustained by one person as the result of the 
conduct of another.” (quoting Wright, supra note 30, at 238)). 
 181. See supra Part II.A.1-2. 
 182. Legal scholars have previously highlighted that one main purpose of tort law is to 
provide a remedy to a wronged plaintiff. KEETON ET AL., supra note 30, at 6. 
 183. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. 
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individuals with public figure status en masse due to the general 
difficulty of establishing actual malice.184 Finally, courts should 
consider the policy repercussions of finding social media users are 
public figures using the different public figure tests. 
As mentioned earlier, an initial problem that arises when 
applying the public figure doctrine to social media is the 
inapplicability of the access-to-media rationale of Gertz.185 Unlike the 
material world, each social media user has access to essentially the 
same tools as the next user.186 As a result, no user has an advantage 
over another in accessing channels of communication to respond to 
defamatory statements.187 Thus, in order to avoid rendering Gertz 
irrelevant, courts should rely heavily on the other main principle of 
Gertz, the assumption of risk or voluntariness rationale, when finding 
a social media user is a public figure.188 With this premise in mind, it 
is useful to analyze each public figure designation individually to 
identify the unique problems each designation poses when applying 
the respective designation to social media. 
 
 184. Williams, supra note 3, at 502-03 (“[The actual malice] standard proves a difficult 
hurdle for public figure plaintiffs to clear, thus making the likelihood of success in a public 
figure defamation action minimal.”) (footnote omitted). 
 185. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. 
 186. One commentator has argued that this equal access gives Internet users a self-help 
measure which upholds the access to the media rationale of Gertz because the majority in Gertz 
based the access to the media prong on the fact that public figures could use their greater access 
to the media to rebut defamation more effectively than private figures who did not have this 
access. Perzanowski, supra note 14, at 860-61; see also Kosseff, supra note 4, at 266 (“In the 
past three decades, the ability for self-help has spread to the masses, largely due to the Internet. 
Services such as Blogspot and Blogger offer free blogs, so anyone with an Internet connection 
can create a publicly accessible forum to correct false statements.”). However, “[t]he existence 
of so many sources of information reduces the number of eyes on any one source; so despite 
posting information on the Internet, an Internet user does not necessarily guarantee herself 
access to an audience of any significant proportion.” O’Connor, supra note 21, at 527. 
 187. See sources cited supra note 21; Boyd & Ellison, supra note 11, at 211-14. 
 188. See O’Connor, supra note 21, at 525 (“In order to appropriately protect the private 
blogger from the heightened standard of actual malice that she would be required to prove as a 
limited-purpose public figure, it is necessary to give weight to the other prongs of the test—that 
is, whether there is an isolated controversy, whether the plaintiff has voluntarily thrust herself 
into the controversy, and so on—before jumping straight to the access to media prong.”). 
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B. The Public Figure Designations 
1. Involuntary Public Figures 
The involuntary public figure designation presents the most legal 
and policy problems when applied to social media users. Primarily, 
applying this doctrine to social media invalidates Gertz. With the 
voluntary rationale of Gertz inapplicable to the involuntary public 
figure doctrine, the test becomes heavily reliant on the access-to-
media rationale.189 However, as noted earlier, no social media users 
have an inherent advantage over one another in access to the media.190 
Therefore, applying the involuntary public figure test in the context of 
social networks would render Gertz completely inapplicable. 
With no guiding principles, any judicial determination that an 
individual is an involuntary public figure would be arbitrary and 
discretionary. This case-by-case approach would violate another 
principle of Gertz, as the Supreme Court deliberately avoided a case-
by-case approach191 in favor of “broad rules of general application.”192 
Moreover, using a case-by-case determination substantially increases 
the possibility that courts designate a large number of people 
involuntary public figures. After all, social media users would be 
powerless to escape a public figure designation without avoiding 
social media altogether. This indiscriminately broad application of the 
test would also disregard the Court’s reluctance to apply the public 
figure doctrine when the test would convert an entire class of people 
into public figures.193 
 
 189. See Barbara L. Stocker, Note, An Analysis of the Distinction Between Public Figures 
and Private Defamation Plaintiffs Applied to Relatives of Public Persons, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1131, 1217-18 (1976) (“If the involuntary public figure concept is to be made consistent with 
the [F]irst [A]mendment theory of Gertz, then only people who are apparently prominent in a 
particular controversy are involuntary public figures.”); see also Hopkins, supra note 75, at 26 
(citing Stocker approvingly). 
 190. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text. 
 191. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974) (“Theoretically . . . the balance 
between the needs of the press and the individual’s claim to compensation for wrongful injury 
might be struck on a case-by-case basis. . . . But this approach would lead to unpredictable 
results and uncertain expectations, and it could render our duty to supervise the lower courts 
unmanageable.”). 
 192. Id. at 343-44. 
 193. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979) (“[I]t is not sufficient to make 
Hutchinson a public figure. If it were, everyone who received or benefited from the myriad 
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The policy implications of adopting a case-by-case approach 
supplement this analysis. Section 230 of the CDA already presents the 
plaintiff with little, if no recourse, other than a direct defamation suit 
against the original party.194 Thus, if every social media user would be 
designated a public figure, the online defamation doctrine would bar 
most social media users from obtaining a remedy. With most social 
media users having to meet an actual malice standard, it would be 
extremely unlikely that any user would recover because of the 
difficulty in overcoming this burden.195 
Indiscriminately determining public figure status would also 
carry many negative incentives for social media users. First, adopting 
such a test would disincentivize people from using social media 
platforms. Some scholars argue that a social media users’ fear of 
reputational damage from defamatory speech would lead to some 
social media users at the margin to abandon social media 
altogether.196 Other scholars argue that fear of obtaining public figure 
status would cause social media users to desert social networking.197 
Whatever the reason users abandon social media platforms, leaving 
such platforms would reduce the speech on social networks that has 
 
public grants for research could be classified as a public figure—a conclusion that our previous 
opinions have rejected.”); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1976) (“It may be 
argued that there is still room for application of the New York Times protections to more 
narrowly focused reports of what actually transpires in the courtroom. But even so narrowed, the 
suggested privilege is simply too broad.”). An en masse application would also contradict the 
Gertz Court’s assertion that involuntary public figures are “exceedingly rare.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 
345. 
 194. See supra Part III. 
 195. See Williams, supra note 3, at 502-03. 
 196. Kosseff, supra note 4, at 272 (“If such voluntary action were enough to qualify 
someone to be a limited-purpose public figure, it could have an additional chilling effect on free 
speech: it would cause people who fear defamation to not take advantage of services such as 
Facebook.”). 
 197. O’Connor, supra note 21, at 528 (arguing that if social media users could easily 
become public figures “individuals might be deterred from sharing or networking broadly 
online”); Gleicher, supra note 21, at 335 (“[T]he uncertainty of whether online speech will 
transform its speaker into a public figure may dissuade people from contributing to the public 
sphere. Faced with reduced legal protection, potential speakers may avoid speaking if they risk 
transforming themselves into public figures. While true public figures have to accept this 
bargain in order to ensure robust public debate, the lower the threshold, the more those not 
seeking publicity will refrain from even limited contribution, and the less participatory the 
public sphere will become.”). 
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had such a socially beneficial role.198 Instead of leaving social media, 
implementing an indiscriminate test would also incentivize users to 
put more effort into making any potentially defamatory statements 
anonymously. This would exacerbate the problem of anonymous 
online defamation suits, which already poses a significant problem in 
the online defamation doctrine.199 Finally, for users who ultimately 
chose to remain on social media platforms, this indiscriminate test 
could lead to converting social media users into public figures en 
masse. As a result, social networks could become increasingly hostile 
and slanderous environments,200 which in turn would decrease the 
social utility of speech on such platforms. These negative 
repercussions that would inevitably result from applying the 
involuntary public figure test to social media platforms should 
provide enough reasons for courts to reconsider the application of the 
involuntary public figure test to such platforms. 
2. General Public Figures 
The general public figure test poses its own unique problems for 
courts when applied to social media. One of the most pressing 
challenges that courts face is the notoriety prong of the general public 
figure test.201 Courts have found figures such as Clint Eastwood, 
Johnny Carson, Carroll Burnett, and Reverend Jerry Falwell to be 
general public figures,202 and it is unlikely a social media user would 
obtain such notoriety based on social media activity alone.203 
 
 198. See supra Part I.C. 
 199. For more discussion of anonymous online defamation lawsuits see Yang-Ming Tham, 
Comment, Honest to Blog: Balancing the Interests of Public Figures and Anonymous Bloggers 
in Defamation Lawsuits, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 229 (2010); Jason C. Miller, Who’s 
Exposing John Doe? Distinguishing Between Public and Private Figure Plaintiffs in Subpoenas 
to ISPs in Anonymous Online Defamation Suits, 13 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 229 (2008). 
 200. See Ciolli, supra note 13, at 278 (“If courts require blogger-plaintiffs to meet the high 
actual malice standard to succeed on a defamation claim, a significant amount of false 
statements and other misinformation about bloggers may become commonplace on the 
[I]nternet, thereby undermining the [I]nternet as a ‘marketplace of ideas.’ Bloggers, knowing 
that they can escape liability for posting defamatory statements about a fellow blogger by not 
investigating their source’s credibility, will post potentially untrue statements with impunity.”). 
 201. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 202. See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text. 
 203. See William M. Krogh, Comment, The Anonymous Public Figure: Influence Without 
Notoriety and the Defamation Plaintiff, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 839, 847 n.82 (2008) (“One 
reason that universal public figure status is rarely litigated may be that the bar is set so high that 
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However, problems arise when courts have only required contextual 
or geographic notoriety.204 It is well known that many social media 
users set their privacy settings to only allow their own social circles to 
view their profile.205 Moreover, several smaller social media 
platforms are already segregated based on ethnic, religious, 
nationality, or other “niche demographics.”206 Thus, if courts were to 
find social media users meet the notoriety requirement when they are 
well-known within their own social media circles, the notoriety 
requirement would be reduced to a mere formality in many cases. 
After all, most social media users would inevitably gain notoriety 
within some subset of their friends or contacts.207 
The contextual notoriety approach would be particularly 
problematic when combined with some courts’ tendencies to define 
voluntary activity under the general public figure test as behavior 
from which publicity inevitably results.208 After all, publicity 
inevitably results from almost all activity on social media because 
social media users inevitably participate in these social groups, and 
some level of notoriety for the user within these groups is bound to 
occur.209 However, when combined with the contextual notoriety 
approach, defining voluntary activity as behavior from which 
publicity inevitably results would further guarantee an en masse 
designation of social media users as general public figures. 
Utilizing this definition of voluntary activity or the contextual 
notoriety approach would also violate several foundational principles 
in Gertz. First, in both Firestone and Wolston, the Court indicated 
disapproval for this definition of voluntary activity.210 Second, the en 
 
those who qualify leave little room for doubt.”); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 352 (1974) (“Absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community, and 
pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual should not be deemed a public 
personality for all aspects of his life.”) (emphasis added). 
 204. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text. 
 205. See sources cited supra note 11. 
 206. See Boyd & Ellison, supra note 11, at 218-19. 
 207. See James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1159 (2009) 
(“[T]he constant human desire to be part of desirable social groups drives social-network-site 
adoption and use.”). 
 208. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text. 
 209. See Grimmelmann, supra note 207, at 1159. 
 210. See supra notes 89, 94 and accompanying text. 
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masse designation of public figures that would inevitably result from 
either of these approaches would violate a common principle of all 
Supreme Court public figure cases: courts should avoid applying the 
doctrine when the doctrine would encompass too large a class of 
people.211 Finally, courts should avoid this definition of voluntary 
activity because such a definition would dilute the last applicable 
rationale of Gertz to social media.212 Because public figures on social 
media are unable to experience a media advantage as compared to 
other social media users, courts would place more emphasis on the 
voluntariness rationale of Gertz.213 It is hardly voluntary to engage in 
activity that is likely to engender publicity when such publicity has 
such a low threshold. 
Thus, the current notoriety approach would permit an 
inordinately large number of social media users to become general 
public figures. The approach suffers from the same policy 
repercussions as the involuntary public figure test.214 For the same 
reasons outlined above, courts should avoid using contextual 
notoriety tests or defining voluntary activity as actions likely to 
engender publicity. 
3. Limited-Purpose Public Figures 
The limited-purpose public figure test presents the fewest 
problems when applied to social media. However, this public figure 
designation creates some challenges. Lower courts’ divergent 
definitions of what constitutes a public controversy pose a problem 
for legal and policy reasons.215 The definition of a public controversy 
as an issue “likely to engender public interest” would likely 
encompass most social media users for similar reasons the definition 
 
 211. See supra notes 88, 96-97 and accompanying text. 
 212. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23, 188. 
 213. See Gleicher, supra note 21, at 335 (“A single video, posted to YouTube, is all that is 
required to start a phenomenon. Because online speech is inexpensive, long-lasting, and far-
reaching, it is difficult to predict what speech will seize enough public attention to transform its 
speaker into a public figure. This undermines the notion of voluntary accession to publicity that 
is inherent in the public figure doctrine.”) (footnote omitted). 
 214. See supra text accompanying notes 194-200. 
 215. For the different legal approaches courts have adopted to determine a “public 
controversy” see supra Part II.B.2. 
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of voluntariness in the general public figure doctrine would do so.216 
Social media users, after all, have garnered international attention 
with a single posting about their preferences despite their relatively 
anonymity.217 Thus, any social media activity whatsoever expressing 
an opinion on a subject could create a public controversy. Moreover, 
this definition would directly contradict the Supreme Court’s 
preference to avoid encompassing too large a class of people within 
the public figure status, which the Court has repeatedly reiterated.218 
Each designation under the public figure doctrine poses its own 
problems when applied to social media users. The presence of 
problems in every designation warrants the consideration of a 
dynamic new approach to the doctrine for social media users. 
C. Recommended Approach for Public Figure Designations 
Because of the negative consequences that result from applying 
the involuntary public figure or general public figure analysis to 
social media,219 courts should require defendants to meet a higher 
burden of proof to establish these particular public figure 
designations. Courts have frequently applied the clear-and-convincing 
standard to situations in which courts disfavor certain claims.220 
Furthermore, strong presumptions can only be overcome by clear and 
convincing evidence.221 The standard is particularly appropriate for 
overcoming the strong presumption that social media users experience 
relatively equal media access within their social networks222 and for 
avoiding the disfavored approach of allowing a social media user to 
easily meet the access-to-the-media prong, which carries negative 
 
 216. See supra text accompanying notes 137-43. 
 217. Sarah Lyall, A Tweet Read Across Britain Unleashes a Cascade of Vitriol on a User, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2009, at A8 (recounting how a Twitter user’s social media posting 
catapulted him into the national spotlight in England). 
 218. See supra notes 88, 96-97 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra Part IV.B.1-2. 
 220. See KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 427 (John W. Strong ed., 
5th ed. 1999). 
 221. See 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 209 (2011) (“The general rule is that strong presumptions 
are accepted, unless clear and convincing evidence has been introduced by the party opposing 
the presumption which establishes the nonexistence of the presumed fact.”); see also Rahnema 
v. Rahnema, 626 S.E.2d 448, 458 (Va. App. 2006). 
 222. See sources cited supra note 21. 
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legal and policy implications.223 Thus, courts should only consider a 
social media user an involuntary public figure if the defendant can 
provide clear and convincing evidence that the user-plaintiff had 
greater access to the media than other users on the plaintiff’s social 
media network. Moreover, courts should strictly construe this burden 
when considering a social media user’s access to the media within the 
social network itself because of the difficulty in determining when a 
social media user has greater access to the media.224 
If defendants can make such a showing, the access-to-the-media 
rationale for public figure designations would no longer be 
inapplicable to involuntary public figures in the social media 
context.225 After all, requiring a defendant to prove that there was a 
“high probability” the plaintiff had a greater access to the media 
would demand more certainty than a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.226 This increased certainty would lead to a more definable 
standard, which would substantially reduce, if not eliminate, the 
arbitrariness of the involuntary public figure test when applied to 
social media users. Eliminating the arbitrary standard reduces risk that 
courts using the involuntary public figure test will convert every 
social media user into a public figure. 
Courts should consider a similar argument when deciding if the 
defendant has satisfied his burden in proving that the plaintiff is a 
general public figure. The clear-and-convincing standard should be 
adopted for the notoriety prong of the general public figures analysis 
for similar reasons that the standard should be used for the 
involuntary public figure test; courts should disfavor allowing social 
media user to easily obtain notoriety because of the substantial risk in 
 
 223. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 224. O’Connor, supra note 21, at 527 (noting that on social media, especially Twitter, “a 
relatively unknown individual can drum up followers numbering in the thousands, many of 
whom may not even know the user’s real name”). However, if a defendant can provide any 
evidence that the plaintiff has greater media access outside of the social network, especially 
media contacts in the material world, then the presumption that media access is equal within 
social networks would no longer be relevant, and the defendant would have satisfied his burden. 
 225. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23, 189. 
 226. Although various definitions have been offered for “clear and convincing” evidence, 
the most applicable standard to social media context would be the “highly probable” standard 
because this situation does not fall under criminal law. See BROUN ET AL., supra note 220, at 
425. 
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invalidating Gertz or encompassing too large a class as public 
figures.227 Adopting this burden would also mirror the advantages of 
using the test for involuntary public figures, as a higher evidentiary 
standard would likely create a less arbitrary test, reducing the risk of 
mass flight from social media networks without decreasing the chance 
of recovery.228 Thus, courts should only find that a social media user 
is a general public figure if the defendant can provide clear and 
convincing evidence that the user-plaintiff had notoriety within the 
social network itself. Similar to the involuntary public figure test, 
courts should strictly construe this burden but find the burden 
satisfied when the defendant provides evidence of notoriety in the 
material world.229 
Comparatively, courts should favor applying limited-purpose 
public figure doctrine to social media users because this designation 
presents the fewest legal and policy problems if certain precautions 
are taken. First, the use of limited-purpose public figure test would be 
unlikely to invalidate Gertz if courts refused to define public 
controversy as an event that is likely to engender publicity.230 Instead 
courts should adopt the test used in Waldbaum and find that a public 
controversy occurs when controversy affects members of the public 
other than the litigants in the case.231 Furthermore, preferring to apply 
the limited-purpose public figure test to social media users upholds 
the Gertz Court’s determination that the limited-purpose doctrine is 
the preferred public figure doctrine.232 Finally, adopting this approach 
would increase the likelihood that plaintiffs will have remedies. Even 
 
 227. See supra text accompanying notes 201-13. 
 228. See supra text accompanying notes 194-200. 
 229. Similar to the access to the media prong of the involuntary public figure test, this 
burden should be strictly construed when considering whether a social media user is notorious 
within the social network itself because of the unlikelihood that a social media user would 
obtain such notoriety within a social media platform. See supra text accompanying notes 202-
03. Evidence that the plaintiff is notorious outside of the social media context would be sure to 
satisfy this burden because the presumption that media access is equal within social networks 
would no longer be relevant and the risk of violating Gertz would disappear. 
 230. See supra text accompanying notes 216-18. 
 231. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 232. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974) (“It is preferable to reduce 
the public-figure question to a more meaningful context by looking to the nature and extent of 
an individual’s participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation.”) 
(emphasis added); see also SMOLLA, supra note 58, § 2:79. 
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if a plaintiff were a public figure, the actual malice standard would 
only apply to statements the plaintiff made in connection to the 
controversy.233 Thus, unlike the other two designations, finding a 
plaintiff is a limited-purpose public figure would not practically bar 
the plaintiff from recovering in all circumstances, improving the 
overall likelihood that the plaintiff could recover in the future.234 
One problem with the limited-purpose public figure doctrine is 
its ambiguity in identifying voluntary activity.235 This ambiguity 
might create problems with invalidating, or at least diminishing, the 
rationales of Gertz by diluting the last applicable rationale of Gertz to 
social media.236 Even if a court were to eschew the definitions of 
voluntariness that include less unequivocally voluntary behavior, 
what constitutes voluntary activity for a social media user is not 
clear.237 In order to determine the best approach to defining 
voluntariness in the context of social media activity, it is instructive to 
consider how courts have defined voluntary activity on the Internet in 
general. 
D. Approaches to Consider for Voluntary Activity 
The Supreme Court has yet to consider the definition of 
voluntariness in the context of the Internet. Although only a few 
lower courts have employed the limited-purpose public figure test 
when determining if a plaintiff’s Internet activity renders him a public 
figure,238 these courts have generally considered two main 
 
 233. See supra text accompanying notes 144-45. 
 234. See supra text accompanying notes 144-45. 
 235. See supra text accompanying notes 128-36. 
 236. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23, 188. 
 237. Kosseff, supra note 4, at 272 (“The ease at which people can disseminate personal 
information over the Internet calls into question whether there ever could be a black-letter 
definition of ‘voluntary’ in the Gertz context.”); see also Gleicher, supra note 21, at 335 (“A 
single video, posted to YouTube, is all that is required to start a phenomenon. Because online 
speech is inexpensive, long-lasting, and far-reaching, it is difficult to predict what speech will 
seize enough public attention to transform its speaker into a public figure. This undermines the 
notion of voluntary accession to publicity that is inherent in the public figure doctrine.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 238. See Tipton v. Warshavsky, 32 F. App’x 293, 295 (9th Cir. 2002); Franklin 
Prescriptions, Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 267 F. Supp. 2d 425, 437 (E.D. Pa. 2003), aff’d, 424 F.3d 
336 (3d Cir. 2005); D.C. v. R.R., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399, 428-30 (Ct. App. 2010); Bieter v. 
Fetzer, No. A04-1034, 2005 WL 89484, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2005); Worldnet 
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approaches: the inherently public approach and the inherently private 
approach. 
1. Inherently Public Approach 
Courts utilizing the inherently public approach have implicitly or 
explicitly treated the Internet as a public forum. As a result, courts 
have concluded that merely entering this forum equates to voluntarily 
accessing an arena for public discussion. For example, consider 
Hibdon v. Grabowski,239 where jet ski enthusiasts posted remarks on 
rec.sport.jetski, an Internet news group devoted to jet skiing.240 The 
enthusiasts criticized Hibdon, the owner of a jet ski customizing 
business, after he appeared in two magazine articles and advertised 
and published information about the speed of his jet skis on 
rec.sport.jetski.241 In response to this criticism, Hibdon sued the jet ski 
enthusiasts for defamation.242 However, the Tennessee state court held 
Hibdon voluntarily inserted himself into a public controversy over the 
top speed of his jet skis when he posted statements on rec.sport.jetski 
and appeared in a magazine.243 The court explicitly indicated it 
considered the Internet a public forum, explaining that “[t]he 
controversy was ‘public’ due to the international reach of the Internet 
news group rec.sport.jetski . . . .”244 Another example is Ampex Corp. 
v. Cargle,245 which involved a disgruntled former employee who had 
posted material on a message board criticizing Ampex, a publicly 
traded company, about its business practices.246 In response to this 
action, Ampex sued the former employee for defamation.247 However, 
the California state court held that Ampex voluntarily inserted itself 
into a public controversy over Ampex’s business practice after it 
 
Software Co. v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 702 N.E.2d 149, 155 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1997); Hibdon v. Grabowski, 195 S.W.3d 48, 60-62 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). 
 239. Hibdon, 195 S.W.3d at 48. 
 240. Id. at 54. 
 241. Id. at 53-54. 
 242. Id. at 54. 
 243. Id. at 60. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Ampex Corp. v. Cargle, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 246. Id. at 866-67. 
 247. Id. at 867-68. 
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posted “press releases and letters . . . on their Web site.”248 In fact, the 
court expressly indicated that it considered the Internet a public forum 
when it stated that the “Yahoo! message board itself is a public 
forum.”249 
The Ninth Circuit employed similar analysis in Tipton v. 
Warshavsky,250 where the court found that an individual qualified as a 
public figure when he “voluntarily involved himself in public life by 
inviting attention and comment on ourfirstime.com.”251 Based on the 
court’s explicit reliance on Ninth Circuit precedent, which considered 
a media outlet a public forum, the court was equating a website with a 
public forum.252 Both of these courts, either implicitly or explicitly, 
defined voluntary activity as merely publishing content on the 
Internet. Thus, under the inherently public approach, the Internet is a 
public forum because Internet activity in itself is sufficient to 
constitute voluntary activity under the limited-purpose public figure 
test. 
2. Inherently Private Approach 
Courts have also used the inherently private approach. This 
approach treats the Internet as an inherently private forum. For 
example, consider D.C. v. R.R.253 In D.C. a high school student, D.C., 
operated a website on which he promoted his entertainment career.254 
Another group of fellow high school students posted messages on 
D.C.’s website which called D.C. derogatory homosexual slurs and 
 
 248. Id. at 870. Another California state court relied on Ampex to apply a nearly identical 
analysis. See Eagle Broadband, Inc. v. Mould, No. H030169, 2007 WL 4358515, at *18-19 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2007). 
 249. Ampex Corp., 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 870. 
 250. Tipton v. Warshavsky, 32 F. App’x 293 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 251. Id. at 295. 
 252. See id.; Ciolli, supra note 13, at 270 (“The court relied on both Gertz and Stolz v. 
KSFM 102 FM in making this determination. In Stolz, a California appellate court held that the 
owner of a media outlet is a limited purpose public figure, even if he or she as an individual 
does not have public notoriety. Through its reliance on the Stolz holding, the Ninth Circuit 
clearly considers websites media outlets.”) (footnotes omitted). This conclusion is also 
supported by the fact that ourfirsttime.com was not a media website, but an adult entertainment 
website. 
 253. D.C. v. R.R., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399 (Ct. App. 2010). 
 254. Id. at 405. 
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threatened his safety.255 After D.C. sued these students for 
defamation, the court considered whether D.C. had obtained public 
figure status.256 The court specifically avoided designating D.C. a 
public figure based on his online activity.257 In fact, the court 
explicitly expressed concerns about the implications of finding public 
figure status based on web access, or social media access, alone.258 
Primarily, the court seemed to act out of fear that finding D.C. a 
public figure would turn “millions of teenagers” into public figures.259 
Accordingly, the court in D.C. treated the Internet as an inherently 
private forum when it refused to hold that mere access to the Internet 
was sufficient to render someone a public figure.260 Thus, this court 
viewed the Internet as an extension to the material world, where 
participation in activities that are widely considered attributable to a 
private forum—talking and socially interacting with friends—is not 
considered sufficient in itself to turn someone into a public figure. 
Whether or not the court in D.C. thought a certain breadth or 
specific type of online activity would turn an Internet user into a 
public figure is uncertain. However, other courts that have considered 
the Internet a private forum have looked to certain activity when 
determining if an individual has left the private forum. One such case 
is Franklin Prescriptions, Inc. v. New York Times Co.261 In Franklin 
Prescriptions, a Pennsylvania district court considered whether a 
local pharmacy injected itself into a controversy after it created an 
information-only website.262 The court refused to find that the 
pharmacy voluntarily acted when the website never sold or took 
orders over the Internet, but only advertised.263 A Minnesota state 
 
 255. Id. at 405-06. 
 256. See id. at 406, 429-30. 
 257. See id. 
 258. See id. at 428-30 (“Millions of teenagers use MySpace, Facebook, and YouTube to 
display their interests and talents, but the posting of that information hardly makes them 
celebrities.”). 
 259. See id. 
 260. See id. 
 261. Franklin Prescriptions, Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 267 F. Supp. 2d 425 (E.D. Pa. 2003), 
aff’d, 424 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 262. Id. at 429-31. 
 263. Id. at 437. For another case where a court looked to the scope of Internet advertising 
to determine public figure status see Worldnet Software Co. v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, 
Inc., 702 N.E.2d 149, 155 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (“Despite the fact that Worldnet advertises on 
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court employed a similar standard in Bieter v. Fetzer.264 In Bieter, a 
philosophy professor who published articles about a conspiracy 
theory sued Fetzer for defamation after Fetzer started an Internet chat 
group in an effort to refute Bieter’s conspiracy claims.265 In finding 
Bieter to have voluntarily acted, the court relied on particular 
behavior exhibited by Bieter.266 The court specifically pointed to the 
fact that Bieter had trumped his own credentials when arguing with 
Fetzer on the Internet chat group.267 Franklin Prescriptions and Bieter 
v. Fetzer demonstrate the inherently private designation of the 
Internet in which courts consider mere Internet activity alone 
insufficient to constitute voluntary activity under the public figure 
doctrine. Instead, these courts tried to identify specific behavior or 
activity the court could point to as evidence of voluntary activity. 
E. The Recommended Approach for Voluntariness 
1. Inherently Public Approach v. Inherently Private 
Approach 
Courts should adopt the inherently private approach employed in 
Franklin Prescriptions and Bieter v. Fetzer268 to determine what acts 
are voluntary. This approach upholds Gertz’s voluntariness rationale, 
which must take precedence in a world of balanced media access for 
social media users. It is important for courts to preserve Gertz’s 
relevancy by providing a clear definition of voluntary action.269 
Moreover, adopting a clear definition also provides unambiguous 
guidelines for social media users, offering users increased certainty 
about the legal consequences of their actions. The inherently private 
approach provides clarity by providing broad identifying 
characteristics of voluntary behavior while leaving discretion to 
individual courts to define the precise actions that constitute voluntary 
activity. 
 
the Internet, the record, as developed thus far, does not demonstrate extensive advertising.”). 
 264. Bieter v. Fetzer, No. A04-1034, 2005 WL 89484 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2005). 
 265. Id. at *1. 
 266. See id. at *3-4. 
 267. Id. at *4. 
 268. See supra Part IV.D.2. 
 269. See supra text accompanying notes 236-37. 
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Further analysis demonstrates why courts should prefer the 
inherently private approach over the inherently public approach. The 
inherently public approach carries serious legal and policy 
consequences. The test sets a very low bar for a social media user to 
become a limited-purpose public figure. As a result, once a public 
controversy develops every social media user could become a limited-
purpose public figure. Thus, this approach converts too large a class 
of people into public figures, which not only contradicts the principles 
elucidated in Supreme Court cases270 but also has policy implications 
by running the risk of incentivizing people to avoid social media 
altogether.271 The inherently private approach avoids these 
consequences. The approach permits individual courts to measure a 
social media user’s activity and establish a threshold to determine 
when he voluntarily thrusts himself into a public controversy. 
Faithfulness to Gertz requires a test that avoids encompassing too 
large a class of people within the public figure designation, and the 
inherently private approach accomplishes this goal better than the 
inherently public approach. 
Moreover, utilizing the inherently private approach provides the 
appropriate balance between a remedy and chilling speech that Gertz 
attempted to strike.272 This test avoids universal public figure status 
for social media users by allowing some social media users a remedy 
through defamation suits. An inherently public approach, on the other 
hand, would not provide the same balance because this approach 
 
 270. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979) (“[I]t is not sufficient to make 
Hutchinson a public figure. If it were, everyone who received or benefited from the myriad 
public grants for research could be classified as a public figure—a conclusion that our previous 
opinions have rejected.”); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1976) (“It may be 
argued that there is still room for application of the New York Times protections to more 
narrowly focused reports of what actually transpires in the courtroom. But even so narrowed, the 
suggested privilege is simply too broad.”). 
 271. Kosseff, supra note 4, at 272 (“If such voluntary action were enough to qualify 
someone to be a limited-purpose public figure, it could have an additional chilling effect on free 
speech: it would cause people who fear defamation to not take advantage of services such as 
Facebook.”). 
 272. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (“Some tension 
necessarily exists between the need for a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate 
interest in redressing wrongful injury. . . . [But, i]n our continuing effort to define the proper 
accommodation between these competing concerns, we have been especially anxious to assure 
to the freedoms of speech and press that ‘breathing space’ essential to their fruitful exercise.” 
(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963))). 
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would substantially decrease the likelihood of social media users from 
succeeding in defamation suits.273 
The inherently private approach would also avoid chilling 
speech, one of the most important principles of First Amendment law 
espoused in New York Times.274 Under the inherently public approach, 
the risk of obtaining public figure status by merely joining social 
networks would lead many social media users to eschew entering 
such networks or to leave them altogether.275 The resulting hesitation 
to participate in social media platforms could chill discussion on a 
forum many see as an extension of their private lives276 and, thus, a 
new forum where the First Amendment protects members’ speech.277 
Chilling speech on social media platforms also reduces the socially 
beneficial speech that occurs on these platforms.278 In contrast, an 
inherently private approach does not convert social media users into 
public figures by merely accessing social networks, presenting a 
decreased risk that users will easily obtain public figure status. 
Accordingly, this approach avoids disincentivizing people from 
joining social networks and engaging in socially beneficial 
behavior.279 Adopting the approach would also align the law with 
 
 273. Williams, supra note 3, at 504 (stating that the actual malice standard “acts almost as 
an affirmative defense for one accused of defaming a public figure, making a plaintiff’s survival 
of summary judgment unlikely”). 
 274. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279, 300-01 (1964). Policy makers 
have expressed concerns when considering the possibility of chilling speech affecting the 
Internet; see also Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2011). 
 275. O’Connor, supra note 21, at 528 (“If individuals no longer feel that they are free to 
connect and share with one another without exposing themselves to the risk of becoming public 
figures in defamation claims, this modern version of the marketplace of ideas could be 
chilled.”). 
 276. See Boyd & Ellison, supra note 11, at 211, 221 (“On many of the large [social 
networking sites], participants are not necessarily ‘networking’ or looking to meet new people; 
instead, they are primarily communicating with people who are already a part of their extended 
social network. . . . Although exceptions exist, the available research suggests that most [social 
networking sites] primarily support pre-existing social relations.”). 
 277. See id. 
 278. See supra Part I.C. 
 279. See Ciolli, supra note 13, at 278 (“If courts require blogger-plaintiffs to meet the high 
actual malice standard to succeed on a defamation claim, a significant amount of false 
statements and other misinformation about bloggers may become commonplace on the 
[I]nternet, thereby undermining the [I]nternet as a ‘marketplace of ideas.’ Bloggers, knowing 
that they can escape liability for posting defamatory statements about a fellow blogger by not 
investigating their source’s credibility, will post potentially untrue statements with impunity.”); 
 
LAFFERMAN  11/26/2012  5:07 PM 
242 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 29 
 
people’s expectations of social media as an extension of their private 
lives.280 Thus, the inherently private approach strikes the appropriate 
balance between providing a remedy to social media plaintiffs 
without chilling speech on social networks 
2. Identifying Voluntary Activity 
Perhaps the most important advantage of considering a social 
network an inherently private forum is that it allows courts to apply 
much of the current public figure doctrine in the social media context. 
Courts have found social media users to have acted voluntarily when 
they have had deliberate contact with a public forum.281 On social 
networks and the material world alike, a public forum comprises any 
forum where all users can freely access information the plaintiff 
placed into the forum.282 To be voluntary, the plaintiff’s action of 
placing information into a public forum must go beyond incidental, 
 
see also supra Part I.C. 
 280. See Boyd & Ellison, supra note 11, at 211, 221; see also O’Connor, supra note 21, at 
526 n.107 (“[I]t has become clear more recently that the Internet is more often a place for 
private individuals to network broadly than for private individuals to take on a public persona by 
virtue of their networking.”). 
 281. Some case law has indicated that an action is voluntary when the plaintiff has 
deliberate, non-incidental contact with a public forum. For example, in Carr v. Forbes, Inc., 259 
F.3d 273 (4th Cir. 2001), the plaintiff acted voluntarily when he advertised his business. Id. at 
280-81. Thus, the plaintiff in Carr acted voluntarily when he deliberately put information into a 
public forum by releasing information about his business in public meetings, editorials, and in 
local media stories. Id.; see also Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 710 (4th Cir. 
1991) (finding a scientist acted voluntarily when he constantly advocated and disseminated his 
research by sending his research to government agencies); Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 
627 F.2d 1287, 1299-300 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding a company CEO acted voluntarily when he 
directed an aggressive advertising campaign and sent a letter to shareholders about a public 
controversy). 
 282. An example of a public forum on a social network would be a “Page” on Facebook 
because outside members of Facebook can access this information. About Facebook Pages: 
What is a Facebook Page?, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/help?page=262355163822084 (last visited Mar. 11, 2012) (“Pages 
are for organizations, businesses, celebrities, and bands to broadcast great information in an 
official, public manner to people who choose to connect with them.”). In comparison, “Groups” 
on Facebook allow for privacy settings that would prevent the forum from being considered 
public. See Groups Basics: How are Pages Different from Groups?; Which One Should I 
Create?, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/groups/basics (last visited Mar. 11, 2012) 
(stating that Groups have privacy settings which could “provide a closed space for small groups 
of people to communicate about shared interests”). 
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everyday contact.283 Individuals in the material world regularly 
contact and place information into public forums, yet the current case 
law indicates an individual only acts voluntarily when the contact or 
placement is deliberate and nonincidental.284 This rationale applies 
equally well to social media. 
Public forums not only include publicly accessible locations on 
social networks but also social media user profiles that are used as a 
“loudspeaker” instead of a “mailbox.”285 A social media page or 
profile is analogous to a loudspeaker when it has no privacy or 
visibility restrictions and its content is completely accessible to those 
who do not even use social media.286 On the other hand, a social 
media page or profile with its visibility limited to a set group of 
people is analogous to a mailbox. A user with a loudspeaker profile is 
more likely to deliberately enter information into a public forum than 
a user with a mailbox profile, who is more likely to only have 
incidental contact with public forums. As a result, the loudspeaker-
mailbox dichotomy would properly align with the interpretation of 
 
 283. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979); Franklin Prescriptions, 
Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 267 F. Supp. 2d 425, 437 (E.D. Pa. 2003), aff’d, 424 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 
2005); Worldnet Software Co. v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 702 N.E.2d 149, 155 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1997). 
 284. Some case law has indicated that an individual’s contact with a public forum must be 
beyond what is considered incidental contact with a public forum that occurs during the course 
of the individual’s private life or occupation. See, e.g., Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135 (finding a 
professor not to have acted voluntary when “Hutchinson’s activities and public profile are much 
like those of countless members of his profession”); Franklin Prescriptions, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 
437 (finding that a pharmacy did not act voluntary when the pharmacy’s website never sold or 
took orders over the Internet); Worldnet Software, 702 N.E.2d at 155 (“Despite the fact that 
Worldnet advertises on the Internet, the record, as developed thus far, does not demonstrate 
extensive advertising.”). 
 285. The terminology for this dichotomous type of social media use was originally 
developed during author’s personal discussions with Michael I. Krauss, Professor of Law at 
George Mason University School of Law in October 2011. 
 286. A good example of a loudspeaker profile would be a corporation’s page on Twitter. 
Corporations, like CNN, set their privacy settings to give the profile complete accessibility, even 
to non-social media users who can access the profile through a Google search. Twitter Privacy 
Policy, supra note 11 (“[Y]our public Tweets are searchable by many search engines and are 
immediately delivered . . . to a wide range of users and services.”). A loudspeaker profile would 
also extend to Facebook profiles which non-social media users have complete access to because 
the privacy settings have been turned off. Sharing and Finding You on Facebook, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info-on-fb#controlprofile (last visited Mar. 11, 
2012) (“Choosing to make something public is exactly what it sounds like. It means that anyone, 
including people off of Facebook, will be able to see or access it.”). 
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voluntary activity mentioned above. 
F. The Recommended Approaches Applied 
This section provides two hypotheticals to illustrate a working 
model of the recommended approach. 
1. The Clear and Convincing Evidentiary Standard 
Applied to Social Media 
The “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard is best 
illustrated by a hypothetical involving Mr. Green.287 Mr. Green likes 
to use his Facebook profile to post videos of himself doing 
unorthodox or humorous activities. Most of these videos draw little 
attention. One day Mr. Green posts a particular video on his Facebook 
profile that only Mr. Green’s eight hundred friends can access. 
Another user then mocks Mr. Green, harming his reputation in the 
process. As a result, Mr. Green sues this individual for defamation. 
Under the current formulation of the public figure test, it is 
unclear whether Mr. Green is a public figure. A court may find that 
Mr. Green acted voluntarily when he accessed the social media 
platform. On the other hand, a court might find that posting the video 
constitutes voluntary activity. If applied universally, however, both of 
these definitions convert almost every social media user who utilizes 
a social media feature into a public figure. Because of this 
consequence, a court may avoid finding that Mr. Green acted 
voluntarily. Nevertheless, a court may define Mr. Green as an 
involuntary public figure. A court could rationalize that Mr. Green 
had greater access to the media because he has considerably more 
than 245 friends, a Facebook user’s average amount of friends.288 It 
would be unclear, however, that Mr. Green’s additional friends give 
 
 287. This hypothetical is loosely based on Sinclair v. TubeSockTedD, 596 F. Supp. 2d 128 
(D.D.C. 2009), in which the D.C. Circuit noted that the plaintiff was “[a]rguably . . . a limited-
purpose public figure” when the plaintiff “posted a YouTube.com video alleging that in 
November 1999, while visiting Chicago, he met then-state senator Barack Obama and then 
purchased cocaine from, used cocaine with, and performed a sex act on Mr. Obama.” Id. at 130, 
133. 
 288. Hayley Tsukayama, Your Facebook Friends Have More Friends Than You, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/your-facebook-
friends-have-more-friends-than-you/2012/02/03/gIQAuNUlmQ_story.html (“The average 
Facebook user has 245 friends.”). 
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him greater access to the media. After all, the greater number of 
friends or contacts on a social network does not exactly correspond 
with greater access to media to rebut a claim.289 
Under the recommended approach, however, a court would find 
Mr. Green is a private figure. Mr. Green has not acted voluntarily 
because he failed to place information within a publicly available 
forum. After all, Mr. Green’s profile is defined as a mailbox, as 
opposed to a loudspeaker profile, because his privacy settings limited 
his profile’s visibility to only his friends. Thus, if Mr. Green is a 
public figure, he can only be found an involuntary public figure, if the 
defendant can prove beyond a “clear and convincing” standard that 
Mr. Green has greater access to the media than other users on the 
plaintiff’s social media network. In Mr. Green’s case, the defendant 
cannot meet this burden when Mr. Green’s access to the media only 
consists of his eight hundred friends. One person having a drastic 
amount of friends or contacts, such as several thousand, may meet the 
clear and convincing standard for greater access to the media. 
However, as mentioned earlier, a greater number of friends or 
contacts than average does not necessarily mean that Mr. Green has 
greater access to the media.290 Moreover, Mr. Green has no access to 
the media outside the social media platform, which would certainly 
satisfy this burden. As a result, the defendant cannot rebut the 
presumption that social media users have relatively equal access to 
the media. Based on this evidence, a court should find the defendant 
failed to satisfy his burden of proof. Accordingly, the court should 
conclude Mr. Green is a private actor, and he need not show the 
defendant acted maliciously in order to recover. 
2. The Voluntariness Approach Applied to Social Media 
The voluntariness approach is best demonstrated by applying the 
 
 289. O’Connor, supra note 21, at 526-27 (“While certainly a person posting on the news 
feeds of his 800 Facebook friends may be well-known within that group, that is hardly grounds 
to require him to prove New York Times actual malice the moment he is defamed; this is even 
more evident on Twitter, where a relatively unknown individual can drum up followers 
numbering in the thousands, many of whom may not even know the user’s real name. . . . 
Communicating constantly through social networking and other Internet service providers has 
become so much a regular and routine practice of private individuals that there is not an 
assumption of receiving widespread attention from those communications.”) (footnote omitted). 
 290. Id. 
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Mr. Smith hypothetical described at the beginning of this 
Comment.291 With the public controversy at issue involving animal 
rights, Mr. Smith would only be a limited-purpose public figure if he 
acted voluntarily. However, it is unclear whether Mr. Smith is a 
public figure under the current public figure doctrine. Similar to the 
Mr. Green hypothetical, a court may find that Mr. Smith’s access or 
postings constituted voluntary activity. However, line-drawing 
problems arise when determining when Mr. Smith’s behavior actually 
became voluntary. Moreover, if a court chose to apply the limited-
purpose public figure test, courts would also have to determine if Mr. 
Smith entered a public controversy. Defining a public controversy as 
a situation that is likely to draw publicity would essentially create a 
public controversy when a social media user uses any social 
networking feature. After all, a single social media post from a little-
known user can result in international attention.292 
The recommended approach provides a straightforward 
framework for determining Mr. Smith’s public figure status. The 
public visibility of Mr. Smith’s profile page determines the 
voluntariness of his action. If Mr. Smith’s page has no visibility 
restrictions, the frequency of Mr. Smith’s postings about animal 
cruelty could be evidence that Mr. Smith uses his social media profile 
as a “loudspeaker” to voluntarily place information into a public 
forum. Based on these facts, a court would conclude Mr. Smith is a 
limited-purpose public figure and he must prove Ms. Jones acted 
maliciously in the context of the controversy. However, if Mr. Smith 
has limited the visibility of his profile, it is more likely he used his 
profile as a “mailbox” and merely sharing an issue he felt very 
strongly about with his defined social network. Under these 
circumstances, a court would conclude Mr. Smith is a private figure 
and he does not need to show Ms. Jones behaved with actual malice. 
CONCLUSION 
As social media expands and online defamation suits continue to 
increase, courts face the dilemma of how to properly apply the public 
 
 291. See supra INTRODUCTION. 
 292. Lyall, supra note 217, at A8 (recounting how a Twitter user’s social media posting 
catapulted him into the national spotlight in England). 
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figure doctrine to social media users without violating the principles 
underlying New York Times, Gertz, and their progeny. To best uphold 
these principles, courts should require a social-media-user defendant 
to prove certain elements of the public figure doctrine according to a 
clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard. To prove a social media 
user is an involuntary public figure, the defendant must provide clear 
and convincing evidence that a social media user plaintiff has greater 
access to the media than other users on the plaintiff’s social media 
network. However, to prove the social media user is a general public 
figure, the defendant must provide clear and convincing evidence that 
the user has general notoriety or notoriety within the social media 
platform. Moreover, when applying the limited-purpose public figure 
test, courts should adopt the presumption that social media is an 
extension of an individual’s private life. Only then can courts apply a 
legal test that not only upholds Gertz but also avoids grave policy 
implications. 
